Intellectual emotions

Vasilyev, I.A. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia

The program thesis of L.S. Vygotsky,which implies that human thinking is the unity of emotions and intelligence,was implemented in the study of intellectual emotions, which wasdeveloped by O.K. Tikhomirov. Theoretical and methodical results ofTikhomirov’s research group were published beginning in the late 1960s in aprominent number of scientific journals and collective monographs (edited byTikhomirov).

The domain of the psychology ofthinking which was developed by Tikhomirov and his colleagues was significantlydifferent from widespread conceptions regarding thinking, such as: themathematical theory of rational decisions (Kozeleckij, 1979); operationaltheories, such as “General Problem Solver” (Ernst & Newell, 1969); thetheory of heuristic structures (Doerner, 1976) and from the “Cognitive Science”(Norman, 1981).

Tikhomirov, relying on empirical data,claimed that human thinking couldn’t be thought of as a “computation”, which isperformed according to an algorithm. He argued, first of all, against thethen-popular analogy of “artificial intelligence” to “human intelligence”.Tikhomirov`s arguments for the qualitative specificity of human thinking werebased on a huge amount of data on goal formation and intellectual emotions inthe regulation of problem solving, which he acquired in a series of experimentswhich were conducted on various samples. A.N. Leontiev’s specific concept,which can be translated as “Engagement” (Vasilyev et al., 1980, p. 19) or“Partiality” (Tikhomirov, 1988, p. 92) could be applied to the aforementioneddata.

The “Intellectual emotions” researchprogram can be considered a contribution to the development of the scientificproblem of connecting cognitive processes with physiological ones (particularlythe reactions of a vegetative nervous system).

Intellectual emotions wereparadoxically considered in psychology for a long time without their emotionalcomponent being taken into account. The connection of intellectual emotions withthe motives, interests and needs of a person was established only in works ofL.S. Vygotsky, S.L. Rubinstein and A.N. Leontiev. These authors emphasized theintegration of cognitive and emotional processes, which was manifested in suchunits of psychological analysis as the subjective reflection of an object(sense).

A.N. Leontiev explicitly claims thathuman activity is in principle “partial” (engaged), and that therefore it isregulated by emotions. Emotions are the psychological means of presenting a motiveto a subject: one can recognize his or her motive through the emotions he orshe meets with. This phenomenon is called the “incentive function” ofemotions. Emotions are relevant in that they function only for the entireactivity of a subject, but not for its subordinated units, such as actions andoperations. Emotions also possess an orienting function, as far as theyare the signals of the development of personal senses of what the situation andaction components are.

Vasilyev (1976, p. 151) definesintellectual emotions as appraisals of the thinking process. That definitioncan be amplified: subject-object relations, which are developed and reflectedin the thinking process, are apprised in intellectual emotions. If we considerthinking as an activity, according A.N. Leontiev’s approach, this relation canbe understood as a motive-goal relationship, or a personal sense. Leontievcharacterizes emotional appraisal with the metaphor of “coloring”. Emotionalcoloring has its own intensity, sign and quality (Vasilyevet al., 1980, p. 32). Emotional appraisal is not originally verbally delivered,but it can get verbal formulation later in the course of mental activity.Emotions are the indicators which present to our consciousness immediately themotivational meaning of unconscious psychic components.

Another question is how emotions takepart in the thinking process. This question wasn`t originally developed inwestern experimental psychology. Two different topics were elaborated in theinvestigation of intellectual emotions in Tikhomirov`s laboratory. The maintopic was the functional analysis of emotional activations in the thinkingprocess. Emotional activations were measured as changes of heart rate andgalvanic skin response. These physiological parameters were considered synchronicallyin connection with states of the problem field, with verbalization and eyemovements, and with the movements of blind chess players. The second topic wasthe description of phenomenon and the classification of intellectual emotions.These two topics were united in the research of O.S. Kopina (1982).

The parts of verbal protocols ofproblem solving that are synchronous with vegetative measures are consideredphenomenal data for the indication of intellectualemotions. This data allows for the operationalizing of the developmentof senses, which is reflected in the dynamics of intellectual emotions. Themain research questions are connected with the analysis of conditions, underwhich intellectual emotions emerge and with the regulatory functions thatemotional activation fulfills in the processes of problem solving.

The method of functionalanalysis of intellectual emotions

Tikhomirov`s experimental paradigm offunctional analysis implies the registration of emotional activation patternssynchronous with the microanalysis of thinking activity in the course ofproblem solving. Skin galvanic response (SGR) and heart rate are thephysiological indicators of patterns of emotional activation. The Fere methodwas used to measure skin resistance (by Sokolov, 1963, 54) with two zincelectrodes put on the surface of the palm.

The results of the experiments(Tikhomirov, 1969; Vinogradov, 1975) justified that skin galvanic response isan indicator of emotional activation and emotional activation’s influences onthe success of problem solving. While the influence of situational emotions canbe considered as an amplifying or extenuating factor (Mandl & Huber, 1983),intellectual emotions emerge intrinsically in thinking process and take part inits personal regulation. The research program, which is dedicated to the studyof intellectual emotions, is aimed at proving that they do not only change thethinking process with respect to some energy level, but also its structure.

Skin galvanic activity inthe process of problem solving

In the experiments of Tikhomirov andKlochko (1976, p. 176-205) skin resistance regularly rose when someproblem occurred during the course of some mental activity. This problem forcedthe subject to make a delay (pause) in the solution process and change thedirection of his activity. The resistance of skin rose during a search for acontradiction (in text) as well. When the contradiction was discovered andformulated, the resistance of skin declined.

Tikhomirov (1983, p. 166) wrote thatvia the preconscious appraisal of uncertainty, the actual acting set wasweakened. The set weakened more with every address to the contradictory placein the text. This pattern took place until the original activity was not givenup and the goals of a new activity were set.

The connection between intenseanticipation, which is reflected in vegetative inactivation, and emotionality,is not clear enough. Authors have supposed that the arousal of sensitivity tocontradictions (in text) took place as a consequence of the emotional coloringof certain places in text. Then another question occurs: what type of emotionalcoloring is vegetative inactivation connected with?

Klochko (1979) connected the discoveryof contradictions with processes related to goal formation. He formulated thefollowing thesis: the emotional processes of appraisal, which constitutesputting current information about a situation into a certain profile, is thebasis of goal formation.

Emotional heuristic

The comparison of the moments of skinresistance decline with connection to various cognitive events was realizedduring a series of scientific studies. Tikhomirov (1975, p. 305) wrote aboutthe heuristic functions of intellectual emotions and Vekker (1981, p. 269) usedthe expression “emotional heuristic”. Emotional activation in these experimentstook place regularly during moments when a problem situation was subjectivelyclarified to some extent: the contradiction, which the subject searched for andhad anticipated, was identified and the subject could name it. Thus it waspossible to explain and solve it.

If we generalize these results, we cansay that emotional activation appears simultaneously with the insight withinthe search process in problem solving. The precise analysis of theemotionally-conditioned development of insights was elaborated in the series ofstudies conducted in Tikhomirov`s laboratory (Tikhomirov, 1969, 1975;Vinogradov, 1975; Terekhov & Vasilyev, 1975; Vasilyev et al., 1980).

Method

All of the aforementioned studies werecarried out using a sample of first-rate chess players, which solved differenttasks in chess. An important advantage of these tasks was that both theresearcher and the player understood the conceptual framework. Thus, chesstasks were accessible for analysis. The researcher could precisely define thestage of the problem’s solution and the possibilities of advancement in eachmoment. Through separate manifestations of behavior (fragments of speech,movements of eyes or tactile movement, which reflected the subjective fixationsof chess fields) it was possible to make a conclusion about the considerationsand intentions of a subject.

Tikhomirov (1969, 1975) worked with aspecific sample of blind chess players because of the opportunity toexternalize preverbal phenomena. Blind chess players had to examine the chessconfiguration with their hands. It was demonstrated that tactile preverbalmanifestations prepare verbal expressions of thinking. This method wasdeveloped in Terekhov’s dissertation and then used in the works of Terekhov andVasilyev (Terekhov, Vasilyev, 1975; Vasilyev et al., 1980).

Chess players examined chess fieldsusing the index finger of their right hand with an electric bulb fixed on it.The movements of the finger were recorded on film at four second intervals. Theskin galvanic response was registered synchronously from the left hand and arecord of verbal reasoning was made during the course of the problem solving .

Differentiation ofregulative functions of intellectual emotions

In the research of Vinogradov (1975)it was shown that emotionally neutral periods occur at the first stage ofelaboration of chess etudes. Immediately after recognizing an initial situationwould a chess player propose a solution which seemed to be the only correctone. Their reasoning was conventional at that stage of problem solving and skingalvanic response didn`t arise.

Interpretation. The hypothesis was that chess players were undertaking their firstconventional attempts at conducting a better examination and understanding thesituation. They could even anticipate these attempts to be unsuccessful andgave them up after truing.

Considerable skin galvanic responseappeared straight away after certain exclamations (“What! Ah, stop!”)(Terekhov, Vasilyev, 1975, p. 111, 134). Skin galvanic response followed averbal description of the insight. Tikhomirov (1983, p. 162) considered an“emotional solution” to be an indicator of an insight, which was a decisiveidea about how to solve something. “Emotional development” reached its maximumat the emotional solution stage.

The revelation of the potential numberof outcomes from a chess game had an emotional echo, since they were connectedwith possibilities, which were relevant to goals.

The emotional appraisal could conflictwith the verbal appraisal of a certain way of finding a solution by moving apiece. Chess players often designated this move as hopeless. Nevertheless hereturned repeatedly to it. The emotional appraisal often turned out to be morecorrect than the verbal appraisal (Vinogradov, 1975, p. 65).

During the course of searching for asolution which was executed imperfectly emotional activations with a negativesign accumulated in a strong skin galvanic response. This general emotionalactivation is prepared summary verbal appraisal “it is time to end up with thisdirection of search” (Vinogradov, 1975, p. 60; Terekhov & Vasilyev, 1975,p. 139).

Tikhomirov (1983, p. 163) summarizedthe function of negative emotions during the course of problem solving: “Theemotions “switch” the subject to a new general plan at the moment when hiscertainty of that the old plan is wrong has not yet begun to be formed as aresult of an explicit logical discourse.”

The regulative function ofintellectual emotions is based on that fact that they make a profile of theproblem situation in relation to goals. One may say that they produce thefigure-background division as the child game “hot-cold” (Tikhomirov, 1975, p.311).

Preverbal, anticipative,preconscious intermediate products of the thinking process have a specialmeaning. Can we strictly define the appraisal function of intellectualemotions, or is it a matter of intuition, i.e. cognitive functions?

With respect to thequestion regarding the anticipative functions of intellectual emotions.

There are two possible approaches toanticipative functions:

1. To define cases with outstripping emotional activation, in which skingalvanic response arises before corresponding tactile or verbal activation;

2. To define the cases of emotionally colored activity or cognition withinan anticipative content.

If the intellectual emotions have anindependent anticipative function, all anticipative functions (1) belong tocases (2), refer to tactile or verbal anticipations. To make such a conclusion,the following presupposition is necessary: the anticipative intellectual emotionis a preconscious expectation, which must be formulated. In this case,emotional activation realizes the function of a regulative emotionalanticipation.

Anticipation can be defined as acognition, which points to a latter cognition (Matthaeus, 1988, p. 596).Therefore the anticipative cognition opens some dialogic cycle: a question — ananswer, a point of view — the appraisal of a point of view (Kuchinskiy, 1983).The problem solver is the single initiator of the solution to such types ofproblems (chess tasks). He can expect a solution only from himself. Thereforehe relies on himself when he elaborates the anticipation: by some intention, hemust realize it, by taking a guess he must solve it, by some question he mustanswer it.

Intellectual emotions are connectedwith different cognitions in the problem solving process. If these cognitionsare arranged according to the phases of the problem solving process, we canestablish the following list:

1. Goal setting, specification of goals and repeated actualization of goals(Vasilyev et al., 1980, p. 150);

2. Intermediate goal formation (p. 98, 150);

3. Formation of particular goals (p. 98, 135, 137);

4. Formation of intentions, connected with the realization of particulargoals (p. 102, 135, 150);

5. The formation of a hypothesis and its appraisal in relation to anintention (p. 88, 90, 102, 136, 137, 150, 151);

6. Analysis of the situation and discovery of important qualities ofelements in the initial, transitional and final states of the problem’s situation(p. 92, 102, 135, 137, 139, 148, 151);

7. A search for and the elaboration of barriers, as manifested in thepossible chess moves of an opponent (p. 95, 102, 137, 139, 148, 150, 151);

8. Plan of action for the realization of intentions or for the realizationof final goals (p. 93, 102, 135, 150);

9. Anticipation of achievement of particular goals (p. 135);

10. Negative or positive results of the attempts at a solution (p. 94,96, 102, 137, 139);

11. Revelation of action which leads to the final goal (p. 137, 139,151);

12. Subjective confidence based on the report on the solution (p.139).

In this list, the intensions andhypothesis can be defined as anticipative cognitions. These are the cases ofintellectual emotions with anticipative content.

Let us give an example of thedevelopment of an intention. The chess task (Fig. 1) can be solved in twomoves. The chess player examines tactilely the e3 square (white bishop) inrelation with the squares d6 (the king of the opponent) and c7, b6. Nonverbalintention can be concluded from this interaction: pressure on the square c7 incheckmate zone with help of bishop b6 can be exerted.

Figure 1 The two moves chess task. The solution is Be3 : d2.

The dynamic of skin galvanic responseis demonstrated on the Figure 2.Designations:top line, a record of tactile activeness using chess symbols; middle, thedynamics of the GSR; bottom, verbal utterances.

Figure 2 The fall of the skin resistance by the development of an intention.

Conclusions

1. In the laboratory of O.K. Tikhomirov, the phenomenon of the acuteemotional regulation of productive thinking was justified. This regulation isrealized by means of the elaboration of axiological profile of cognitions. Thefollowing definition of intellectual emotions can be given: intellectualemotions are the appraisals of specific cognitive objects: the contradictions,assumptions, probabilities, intermediate and the final results of operations(Vasilyev, 1979). Intellectual emotions consequently engage in the regulationof productive thinking. These emotions are different from emotions that aredescribed as “emotion and cognition”. The latter emotions don`t organize thinking,but disorganize it. These emotions narrow down the regulation of thinking toautomatic responses.
2. The applied research method was complicated and deeply elaborated. Themain point of the method consisted of the synchronous registration of theexternal (tactile) elaboration of problem, skin galvanic response and verbalutterances with respect to chess tasks, which were suitable for deeppsychological analysis, including an accurate comparison of emotions andcognitions.
   • In case there was a highlevel of accordance between emotions and cognitions, cognitive phenomena couldbe registered by relying on the indices of vegetative activation.
3. The following position was elaborated in Tikhomirov`s group:intellectual emotions are not only the energetic resource or catalysts for thethinking process, but the determinants of its structure. Intellectual emotionsare the intimate regulators of thinking. These emotions indicate thatcognitions have personal meanings to them.

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