Cognitive psychology

Participants in Experiment 1 completed a 36-item life events inventory (LEI) in their native language (Russian) two separate times, over a 1-week period. Between the two LEIs, participants got 12 items translated from Russian into English and 12 items in Russian. They performed a series of English-language exercises on translated items and Russian-language exercises on non-translated items. After performing exercises on items translated from Russian into English participants increased their confidence that these life events had occurred in their personal past. There was no similar effect for nontranslated items and for control items. Experiment 2 was run to examine if two factors - a change in linguistic context and a change in level of abstraction taken together boosted the effect. Participants completed a 24-item LEI in Russian two separate times, over a 1 -week period. Between the two LEIs, participants got 12 of these life events at the higher level of abstraction (e.g., "Got lost in a shopping mall" or "found yourself at an unfamiliar public place") translated from Russian into English. Participants translated the event from English into Russian and wrote a sentence using the gist of the item. After performing language exercises on items at the higher level of abstraction participants increased their confidence that these life events had occurred in their personal past. The magnitude of effect was almost twice bigger than in Experiment 1. These results indicate that a change in linguistic context can produce imagination inflation. We discuss our findings in terms of familiarity misattribution, whereby processing fluency is experienced as familiarity and misattributed to autobiographical memory.

The article reveals the subject-matter of the systemacity (consistency) principle in psychology and some forms of its realization. Basic statements of the original version of the system approach by major Russian psychologist and science institutor Boris F. Lomov are considered. The state and the tendencies of development of system approach in the modern period are discussed.

The article describes various studies on awareness - unawareness processes conducted at the department of General psychology at St.-Petersburg State University, Russia. The topic under discussion is the aftereffect of the negative choice, which was discovered by the author. This phenomenon is related to some other well-known psychological phenomena. The article discusses the meaning of this phenomenon (the aftereffect of the negative choice) for the research program in the psychology of consciousness.

At the current stage the history of researching creativity appears to have drawn a curve which agrees with the methodological conceptions of L.S. Vigotsky. His idea, that of a psychology which intends to study phenomena in their complexity, should replace the methods of dividing into elementary components (atoms) by methods which single out essential non-elemental units, and should make obvious the logic of understanding creative abilities, as it historically developed in the 19lh and 20lh centuries.

The association of self-regulation and personality factors with rational decision making was investigated using an experimental model of political voting. The results revealed different sets of personality characteristics for rational and emotional voters. A self-regulation/personality typology of decision making was then constructed, and traits representing self-regulation, cognition, and personality were examined as predispositions toward rational decision making. As a result, specific connections among these variables were uncovered, through which the primary role of the conscious self-regulation system in the management of rational decision making in a political voting context was established.

The problem of consciousness is examined in the article. It is argued that all the existing approaches to consciousness do not explain the role consciousness plays in human life. An attempt of revealing and describing the principles of the mind’s work is made. Experimental phenomena observed by the author and his followers, particularly, the tendency of previously non-realized ideas not to be realized subsequently, are reviewed. The discussion of these phenomena allows to formulate a novel view on the nature of consciousness.

The recent revolutionary changes in the cognitive psychology of development, touching upon the basic conceptions of psychology, are generalized in this article. The problem of theoretical changes connected with systemic evolutionary approach, dynamic nonlinear system theory, and connectionism, is discussed. The author analyses four basic theses of revolutionary changes: from sensory-motor infant to representative one; from the leading role of activity to the unity of perception and action; about the continuity of the subject formation, instead of axiom of subjectivity of the adult, mature person; about the continuance of genetic and environmental instead of social primacy in the mental development of a person. There are key arguments of new conceptions, obtained by the author and other researchers.

Article is devoted to the issues of symbolic mediation and diagnostic of time perception in sport. Distinction between iconic and symbolic mediation is discussed. Evidences of effective implementation of symbolic mediation in sport are examined. Means of optimization of sportsmen and sportswomen training by the instrumentality of symbol are considered. The results of time perception diagnostic of Russian synchronized swimmers are described. It was shown that sportswomen are greatly varied in accuracy and stability of reproduction of long (2–5 sec) and estimation of short (less than 250 ms) time intervals, which were filled with different contents – ticks of metronome, persistent sound, pressuring the button and etc. The improvement of individual characteristics of time perception is an important psychological resource of sports achievements increase.

This article stresses the social importance of the problem of giftedness and in this connection the necessity to clarify this concept scientifically. The history of this problem reveals the origins of reduction of the concept and the wide-spread notion of giftedness as "intelligence level above average. "There are two reasons of it: 1) Galton's components of giftedness were put into a complex; 2) there were no measuring techniques of this complex. The unit of the analysis of giftedness was formed after Galton's notion of giftedness as comprised of components was supplemented with the method of measurement -"systematic observation"- and understood as an ability to generate activity at one's own initiative. Then it became possible to realize Galton's concept of giftedness as a manifestation of mind and character.

The present paper describes two studies that investigated incremental predictive value of tolerance and intolerance for uncertainty in predicting creativity. The first study shows significant positive incremental predictive power of tolerance for uncertainty over general intelligence in predicting creativity. The second study reveals a negative relationship between intolerance for uncertainty and creativity with fluid intelligence scores being already accounted for. Overall, tolerance for uncertainty promotes creativity, whereas intolerance for uncertainty impedes it, demonstrating that creativity draws on both intellectual potential and processes of uncertainty acceptance.

This research is devoted to the investigation of the role of conscious self-regulation in human development and activity. The concept of conscious self-regulation of a subject's voluntary activity and the history of its research conducted in Psychological Institute RAE are discussed. The results of the research dedicated to the typology of individual styles of self-regulation and their relationship with educational and professional activity effectiveness are presented. Personal dispositions have specific influence on the individual peculiarities of regulatory profile. It is concluded that the integrated system of individual self-regulation includes dynamic and content aspects of a personality, its conscious and subconscious structures for development and achievement of goals

The article describes various aspects of symbolic mediation and is aimed at showing its specificity. The author views a situation of uncertainty as a structural element of a symbol and introduces the notion of a symbol being a special tool for orientation in such situations. On the one hand, a symbol is contrasted to a sign, and on the other, is regarded as a transitional form in the process of its mastering. Author pays special attention to understanding the role of symbol in connection with understanding of play and its role in child’s development. Emotional and cognitive functions of symbol are defined and illustrated by examples.

Background. Ideas about relationships between “I”, egocentric spatial orientation and the sense of bodily “Self ” date back to work by classics of philosophy and psychology. Cognitive neuroscience has provided knowledge about brain areas involved in self-ref­erential processing, such as the rostral prefrontal, temporal and parietal cortices, often active as part of the default mode network (DMN).

Objective and Method. Little is known about the contribution of inferior parietal areas to self-referential processing. Therefore, we collected observations of everyday be­havior, social communication and problem solving in patients with brain lesions local­ized either in the left inferior parietal cortex (LIPC group, n = 45) or the right inferior parietal cortex (RIPC group, n = 58).

Results. A key characteristic of the LIPC group was an overestimation of task com­plexity. This led to a prolonged phase of redundant and disruptive contemplations pre­ceding task solution. In the RIPC group, we observed disorders in reflective control and voluntary regulation of behavior. Abilities for experiencing emotions, understanding mental states, and social communication were to a great extent lost. Results are inter­preted within a multilevel framework of cognitive-affective organization (velichkovsky, 2002). In particular, we highlight the role of right-hemisphere mechanisms in self-refer­ential cognition, emotional and corporeal awareness. This is consistent with recent data on a profound asymmetry in connectivity of left and right hippocampi within the DMN (Ushakov et al., 2016)

Conclusion. It seems that the center of egocentric spatial representation plays a spe­cial role in accessing self-related data. Normally, the right hippocampus provides a holis­tic representation of surrounding and, thus, an easy-to-find gateway into much of what we used to call “subjective experience”. This heuristics becomes misleading in the case of right-sided brain lesions.

Background. The problem of polysemy has attracted scholars’ attention since antiq­uity and interest in the phenomenon never lessens. A substantial number of works have been published on the cognitive nature of meaning ambiguity. Despite a new emphasis on the cognitive aspects of polysemy, little has been done towards an inte­grated approach to the study of this linguistic phenomenon.

Objective and Method. This work’s objective was to contribute to an integrated interdisciplinary theory of polysemy. To this end, we explored the cognitive founda­tion of meaning using empirical and theoretical research methods, but mostly relying on semiotic analysis of texts central to the humanities. In particular, we analyzed the dichotomy of conscious vs. unconscious processing in the acquisition and use of polysemy. For the identification of cognitive patterns of polysemy development in ontogenesis, we used probabilistic conceptual modeling.

Results. The acquisition of meaning is a conscious process: it is a conscious interaction of the speaker with an interlocutor and their common social environ­ment. On the other hand, meanings are unconscious unless a connection between the phonological, acoustic form and the concept is established. Correspondingly, polysemy is conscious when a new meaning is formed in the course of social inter­action. However, polysemy, as an inherent language phenomenon, remains uncon­scious for native speakers, who are unaware of its presence provided they are not involved in some form of intentional language games (pun, zeugma or intended ambiguity).

Conclusion. The present approach to the analysis of meaning ambiguity seems to be a productive endeavor. Further research into polysemy has to be based on a range of additional types of evidence, including those obtained by methods of cogni­tive neuroscience.

Background. The sense of agency (SoA) provides us with the experience of be­ing a physical agent with free will. On a phenomenological basis, SoA can be di­vided into sensory components (feeling of agency, FoA) and more cognitive com­ponents (judgment of agency, JoA). Both these components can be independently measured.

Objective and Method. A new method was developed to test the possibility of preserving SoA and its components in the atypical conditions of passive movements. Parameters of the participant’s movement in response to a visual stimulus (reaction time, speed, and amplitude) were measured and used to control a servo that simu­lated the movement (executed passive movements). The scores on the psychometric scale of the agency and the event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded for variable movement delays relative to the stimulus onset.

Results. It was found that the FoA was not present under passive movement con­ditions. At the same time, participants associated these movements with their own activity (JoA), even when their delay after the stimulus onset was too short to be ac­tively reproduced. The somatosensory ERPs’ amplitude decreased for the expected movements, demonstrating an inverse relationship with the agency scores. The lowest amplitude was observed when movements were actuated by another hand. The results can be explained using a predictive forward model, since the FoA was not observed in the absence of active movements. On the other hand, the ERPs’ data and the presence of JoA with various delays between the stimulus and movement support the postdic­tive model of agency, where the leading role is assigned to prejudice and contextual knowledge related to the action.

Conclusion. It seems that the “context pressure” of the situation, demanding a mandatory response to the stimulus, forms a cognitive prediction of movements without firm sensory representation.

Background. The structure of consciousness has long been a cornerstone problem in the cognitive sciences. Recently it took on applied significance in the design of computer agents and mobile robots. This problem can thus be examined from perspectives of phi­losophy, neuropsychology, and computer modeling.

Objective. In the present paper, we address the problem of the computational model of consciousness by designing computer agents aimed at simulating “speech understand­ing” and irony. Further, we look for a “minimal architecture” that is able to mimic the effects of consciousness in computing systems.

Method. For the base architecture, we used a software agent, which was programmed to operate with scripts (productions or inferences), to process incoming texts (or events) by extracting their semantic representations, and to select relevant reactions.

Results. It is shown that the agent can simulate speech irony by replacing a direct aggressive behavior with a positive sarcastic utterance. This is achieved by balancing be­tween several scripts available to the agent. We suggest that the extension of this scheme may serve as a minimal architecture of consciousness, wherein the agent distinguishes own representations and potential cognitive representations of other agents. Within this architecture, there are two stages of processing. First, the agent activates several scripts by placing their if-statements or actions (inferences) within a processing scope. Second, the agent differentiates the scripts depending on their activation by another script. This multilevel scheme allows the agent to simulate imaginary situations, one’s own imagi­nary actions, and imaginary actions of other agents, i.e. the agent demonstrates features considered essential for conscious agents in the philosophy of mind and cognitive psy­chology.

Conclusion. Our computer systems for understanding speech and simulation of irony can serve as a basis for further modeling of the effects of consciousness.